Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining

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Publication:697943

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2850zbMath1015.91016OpenAlexW3125111579WikidataQ57614092 ScholiaQ57614092MaRDI QIDQ697943

Talia Rymon, Sankar Sen, Eric J. Johnson, Colin F. Camerer

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/22052/




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