Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
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Publication:1119188
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90120-8zbMath0669.90099OpenAlexW2051378472MaRDI QIDQ1119188
Roy Radner, Wolfgang Leininger, Peter B. Linhart
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90120-8
Nash equilibriaincomplete informationdifferentiable strategiesnonzero-sum gamesealed-bid bargaining mechanism
Related Items (33)
What to maximize if you must ⋮ The modified Vickrey double auction ⋮ On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor ⋮ The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions ⋮ Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency ⋮ The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study ⋮ The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms ⋮ Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions ⋮ (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ⋮ Optimal information structures in bilateral trade ⋮ Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games ⋮ Reprint of: ``Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ Improved approximation to first-best gains-from-trade ⋮ (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games ⋮ Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations. ⋮ Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication. ⋮ Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values ⋮ Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information ⋮ Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders ⋮ Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply ⋮ The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms ⋮ Bilateral trading with naive traders ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading ⋮ Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values ⋮ Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables ⋮ Cheap talk can matter in bargaining ⋮ Strategic play and adaptive learning in the sealed-bid bargaining mechanism ⋮ The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs ⋮ A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information ⋮ Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
Cites Work
- Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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