An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
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Publication:1123107
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(89)90017-7zbMath0676.90011OpenAlexW2127342275WikidataQ56936208 ScholiaQ56936208MaRDI QIDQ1123107
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/23071
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