Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90100-VzbMath0759.90017MaRDI QIDQ1196191

Guofu Tan

Publication date: 17 December 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

sealed-bid auctioncompetitive procurement and contractingfree-entry perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (21)

Auctions with entry and resale ⋮ Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations ⋮ Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs ⋮ A mixed integer model of bidding strategies for outsourcing ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments ⋮ Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry ⋮ Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert ⋮ Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs ⋮ Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting ⋮ Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions ⋮ The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions ⋮ First-price auction implements efficient investments ⋮ Auctions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Auction design with opportunity cost ⋮ Contracts with endogenous information ⋮ Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry ⋮ Contest with pre-contest investment ⋮ Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly ⋮ Strategically equivalent contests

Cites Work

• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Auctions with entry
• Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists
• A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide
• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View

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