Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
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Publication:1272980
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0610zbMath0912.90291OpenAlexW2135216421MaRDI QIDQ1272980
Publication date: 2 December 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1103.pdf
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Cites Work
- Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Majority-rule voting with correlated votes
- Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
- Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
