When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00050-2zbMath1069.91002WikidataQ70743404 ScholiaQ70743404MaRDI QIDQ1420512

Amrita Dhillon, Ben Lockwood

Publication date: 2 February 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

pluralityCondorcet winnersorder of elimination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (18)

Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters ⋮ Can the majority lose the election? ⋮ Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule ⋮ Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies ⋮ Iterative voting and acyclic games ⋮ Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule ⋮ Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case ⋮ Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability ⋮ Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee ⋮ The chairman's paradox revisited ⋮ Weak undominance in scoring rule elections ⋮ Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting ⋮ Bargaining through approval ⋮ Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency ⋮ The Basic Approval Voting Game ⋮ The trembling chairman paradox ⋮ Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules ⋮ On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games

Cites Work

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• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Maximum games, dominance solvability, and coordination
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
• Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy

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