Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00073-3zbMath1033.91029MaRDI QIDQ1867762

Rajiv Vohra, Enrico Minelli, Françoise Forges

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Core; Exchange economy; Asymmetric information; Incentive compatibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

Related Items

Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies, Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core, Group stability in matching with interdependent values, Stability with one-sided incomplete information, Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies, Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values, Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values, Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies, Incentive efficient risk sharing in a settlement mechanism, Some new characterization of rational expectation equilibria in economies with asymmetric information, The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information, Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery, The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete., Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information., The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game., The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information, The anonymous core of an exchange economy., The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty, Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information, An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information, Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries, Information transmission in coalitional voting games, Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments, Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information, The weak sequential core for two-period economies, Market games with asymmetric information: the core, Incomplete information, credibility and the core, Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example, COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS

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