Self-rejecting mechanisms
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Publication:2178032
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.01.006zbMath1437.91126OpenAlexW3005413465MaRDI QIDQ2178032
Publication date: 7 May 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.006
Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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Cites Work
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