Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0393-5zbMath1201.91082OpenAlexW2129750227MaRDI QIDQ2268363

Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 5 March 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0393-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects ⋮ Balanced ranking mechanisms ⋮ Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction ⋮ Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity ⋮ A simple budget-balanced mechanism ⋮ Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms ⋮ Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects ⋮ Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads

Cites Work

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• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money
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• Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game

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