Pessimistic information gathering

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.03.014zbMath1318.91138OpenAlexW2130831373MaRDI QIDQ2347771

David Martimort, Elisabetta Iossa

Publication date: 8 June 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationmoral hazardinformation gatheringpessimism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (2)

ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• Ignorance in agency problems
• Optimal auctions with information acquisition
• All-or-nothing information control
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Auctions with costly information acquisition
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Value of communication in agencies
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection
• Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
• Information acquisition in committees
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Sequential Screening
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• Principal and Expert Agent
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

This page was built for publication: Pessimistic information gathering