Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
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Publication:4286935
DOI10.1287/moor.18.4.803zbMath0806.90085OpenAlexW2168987865MaRDI QIDQ4286935
Alvin E. Roth, Uriel G. Rothblum, John H. Vande Vate
Publication date: 3 May 1994
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.4.803
Linear programming (90C05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Matching models (91B68)
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