Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00546.xzbMath1141.91400OpenAlexW2079755863MaRDI QIDQ5475057

Claudio Mezzetti

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00546.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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