Repeated communication with private lying costs

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105668zbMath1520.91074OpenAlexW4372233680MaRDI QIDQ6166489

Harry Di Pei

Publication date: 6 July 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105668

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionpersistent private informationrepeated communication game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (1)

Repeated communication with private lying costs

Cites Work

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