Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
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Cites work
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- Auction design without quasilinear preferences
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- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3307201 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3186512 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in Teams
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- Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
- Non-manipulable house allocation with rent control
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
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- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- The core of the matching game
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- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Cited in
(21)- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
- Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
- Provision-after-wait with preferences ordered by difference: tighter complexity and better approximation
- Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: a positive result
- On finding and detecting efficient assignments in the case of multiple inputs and outputs
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- Static and Dynamic Assignment Models with Multiple Objectives, and Some Remarks on Organization Design
- Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
- Strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with hard budget constraints and income effects
- Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money
- Quantifying the inefficiency of multi-unit auctions for normal goods
- Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets
- A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices
- Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation problems with money: decreasing incremental valuations with income effects
- Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: structural properties and the serial Vickrey mechanism
- Endowments-swapping-proof object reallocation with transfers
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
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