Let them cheat!

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.01.001MaRDI QIDQ423773zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Rodrigo A. Velez, William Thomson

Publication date 4 June 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

equal division Walrasian solutionequal-sacrifice solutionmanipulation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3671968 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Are incentives against economic justice?
• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint
• Games of fair division
• Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Microeconomic theory
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• The manipulability of the Shapley-value

Cited in

(9)

• Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
• Equal area rule to adjudicate conflicting claims
• Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
• New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation
• Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3894788 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• The manipulability of the Shapley-value

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