High bids and broke winners

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2715zbMath0998.91018MaRDI QIDQ5952426

Charles Z. Zheng

Publication date: 24 November 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

PCSdefaultauctionbudgetC-block auctionFCCspectrum auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (25)

Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers ⋮ Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement ⋮ Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility ⋮ Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud ⋮ Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints in auctions ⋮ Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers ⋮ On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints ⋮ Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach ⋮ Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule ⋮ Credit auctions and bid caps ⋮ An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders ⋮ Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization ⋮ Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements ⋮ The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints ⋮ Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty ⋮ Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders ⋮ Participation and welfare in auctions with default ⋮ Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types ⋮ Limited liability and high bids in English auctions ⋮ Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case

Cites Work

• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages
• Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
• Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance

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