Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
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Publication:5954062
DOI10.1006/game.2000.0824zbMath1168.91335OpenAlexW2164820179MaRDI QIDQ5954062
Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein
Publication date: 15 October 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/389695f022b0a6b55d840372f9d7dcca8440a82e
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