Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.001zbMath1347.91171OpenAlexW1491181859MaRDI QIDQ290170

Bettina Klaus, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessdeferred-acceptance-algorithmindivisible objects allocationpopulation-monotonicityresource-monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (17)

Decentralized college admissions under single application ⋮ Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation with outside option ⋮ School choice with preference rank classes ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Reallocation with priorities ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices ⋮ Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods ⋮ Some further properties of the cumulative offer process ⋮ Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible ⋮ On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules ⋮ How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects ⋮ Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities ⋮ Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants

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