Picking the winners

DOI10.1007/S00182-012-0332-ZzbMath1280.91005OpenAlexW2165844892MaRDI QIDQ378331

Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 11 November 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0332-z

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcontestsmechanism designbiased jurorsdominant strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (9)

Selecting winners with partially honest jurors ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms ⋮ Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents ⋮ Sensitivity analyses and measurements for group decisions using weighted scoring rules ⋮ Evaluation and strategic manipulation ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition ⋮ An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave ⋮ Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury

Cites Work

• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• Convergence results for unanimous voting
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• The scholarship assignment problem
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Aggregation of expert opinions
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules

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