Comparative cheap talk

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.07.003zbMath1142.91359OpenAlexW3121520062MaRDI QIDQ869851

Rick Harbaugh, Archishman Chakraborty

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

complementaritiesmultidimensional cheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (24)

Stress tests and information disclosure ⋮ Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Discounted quotas ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Cheap Talk and Editorial Control ⋮ Pervasive signaling ⋮ Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission ⋮ Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions ⋮ Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult ⋮ When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication ⋮ Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests ⋮ Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions ⋮ Cheap talk about the relevance of multiple aspects ⋮ Multi-period competitive cheap talk with highly biased experts ⋮ Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes ⋮ Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case ⋮ Bayesian persuasion with cheap talk ⋮ Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification ⋮ The economics of excuses: job market cheap talk with pre-employment tests ⋮ Voting on multiple issues: What to put on the ballot? ⋮ Strategic information transmission despite conflict ⋮ An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk ⋮ Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games ⋮ Competitive cheap talk

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• A Theory of Credibility
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Rational Debate and One-Dimensional Conflict*
• Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
• Long Cheap Talk
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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