Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.002zbMath1230.91024OpenAlexW2052346689MaRDI QIDQ980953

Martin Sefton, Michalis Drouvelis, Maria Montero

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsvotingpower indicesnon-cooperative bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (13)

Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining ⋮ Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: null player or not? ⋮ Gender and nominal power in multilateral bargaining ⋮ Too big to prevail: the paradox of power in coalition formation ⋮ Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments ⋮ Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Veto power in committees: An experimental study ⋮ Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence ⋮ Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis ⋮ Formal versus informal legislative bargaining

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
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• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
• Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study
• Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
• Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
• Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
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• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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• A Structural Model of Government Formation
• Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
• Bargaining and Value
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

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