Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90040-OzbMath0773.90103OpenAlexW1995158831MaRDI QIDQ1201142

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90040-o

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategy forward induction preplay communication stability concepts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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