Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0106-2zbMath1098.91032OpenAlexW2063680475MaRDI QIDQ2432505

Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0106-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models ⋮ The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner ⋮ Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules ⋮ Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey ⋮ On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory ⋮ On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives ⋮ Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules ⋮ Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules ⋮ Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis ⋮ Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules ⋮ Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs ⋮ Strategic voting and nomination ⋮ One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness ⋮ On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions ⋮ Statistical evaluation of voting rules

Cites Work

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• A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
• Unsettling aspects of voting theory
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
• Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
• Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic

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