The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
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Publication:2569172
DOI10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8zbMath1106.91002MaRDI QIDQ2569172
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ana B. Ania
Publication date: 18 October 2005
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8
supermodularity; quasisupermodularity; optimal-aggregate taking strategy; symmetric aggregative games
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