Sequential Screening
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2707933
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00150zbMath0977.91028MaRDI QIDQ2707933
Publication date: 4 April 2001
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00150
91B42: Consumer behavior, demand theory
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