Publication:3624066
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zbMath1165.91387arXiv1110.0025MaRDI QIDQ3624066
Publication date: 28 April 2009
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.0025
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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