On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions

DOI10.2307/1912822zbMath0443.90009OpenAlexW1968406976MaRDI QIDQ3887167

Mark Walker

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912822

zbMATH Keywords

transferable utility environmentsPareto optimal outcomesdominant strategy mechanismnon-existence of mechanismsprivate goods allocationpublic goods allocationstrategy-proof choice mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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