Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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Publication:4197572

DOI10.1287/moor.4.2.99zbMath0409.90008OpenAlexW1977911709MaRDI QIDQ4197572

Pradeep Dubey, Lloyd S. Shapley

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.4.2.99




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