Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion

DOI10.1137/16M1098334zbMath1464.91022arXiv1503.05988OpenAlexW1594152038WikidataQ126979527 ScholiaQ126979527MaRDI QIDQ4997315

Shaddin Dughmi, Hai-Feng Xu

Publication date: 29 June 2021

Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing, Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.05988

zbMATH Keywords

signalinginformation structuresBayesian persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

Related Items (16)

Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. ⋮ Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials ⋮ On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals ⋮ The secretary recommendation problem ⋮ Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games ⋮ Public Bayesian persuasion: being almost optimal and almost persuasive ⋮ Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models ⋮ Bayesian persuasion: reduced form approach ⋮ A population's feasible posterior beliefs ⋮ Optimizing Bayesian Information Revelation Strategy in Prediction Markets: the Alice Bob Alice Case ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the hardness of designing public signals ⋮ The Complexity of Contracts ⋮ Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication

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