Restricted feedback in long term relationships
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52448 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
- A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
- A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: genericity, stability, and purification
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
- Computing Supergame Equilibria
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
- Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
- Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
- How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?*
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
- Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
- Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
- International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work
- On the computation of value correspondences for dynamic games
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Recall and private monitoring
- Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Repeated games with frequent signals
- Repeated games with one-memory
- Repeated games with present-biased preferences
- Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
- Sustainable reputations with rating systems
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Cited in
(7)- Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games
- Bounded memory and incomplete information
- A strategic dynamic programming method for studying short-memory equilibria of stochastic games with uncountable number of states
- Long-term relationships as safeguards
- Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games
- Variable temptations and black mark reputations
- Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
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