Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
From MaRDI portal
Publication:514494
DOI10.1007/s00199-016-1023-yzbMath1404.91153OpenAlexW2564410999MaRDI QIDQ514494
Nicholas C. Yannelis, Luciano I. de Castro, Zhi-Wei Liu
Publication date: 2 March 2017
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1023-y
Noncooperative games (91A10) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items
Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility, Incentive compatibility under ambiguity, Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity, Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium, A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility, Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity, Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences, Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility, Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization, On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences, Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver, Robust coalitional implementation, Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion
- Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
- Why uncertainty matters: discounting under intertemporal risk aversion and ambiguity
- Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
- Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
- Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks
- Implementation under ambiguity
- Core and equilibria under ambiguity
- Bayesian learning with multiple priors and nonvanishing ambiguity
- Credible implementation
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- The core of an economy with differential information
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Value allocation under ambiguity
- Monetary equilibria and Knightian uncertainty
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Bayesian Implementation
- An extensive form interpretation of the private core
- Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies