Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
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Publication:634537
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.006zbMath1247.91056arXiv0910.3580OpenAlexW2034375542MaRDI QIDQ634537
Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein
Publication date: 16 August 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0910.3580
Related Items (13)
Extending tournament solutions ⋮ Minimal extending sets in tournaments ⋮ Rational stability of choice functions ⋮ WARP and combinatorial choice ⋮ On rational choice from lists of sets ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Rationalizable choice functions ⋮ On the structure of stable tournament solutions ⋮ Minimal retentive sets in tournaments ⋮ Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice ⋮ Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations ⋮ Indepth combinatorial analysis of admissible sets for abstract argumentation
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