Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
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Publication:866939
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0158-3zbMath1134.91362OpenAlexW3123895719MaRDI QIDQ866939
Publication date: 14 February 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1285055/guid-1218d82d-0362-4eb5-b495-0b3fae9fbb74-ASSET1.0.pdf
Related Items (18)
Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria ⋮ Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support ⋮ On the implementation of the median ⋮ Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation ⋮ Implementation via mechanisms with transfers ⋮ Robust implementation in general mechanisms ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Repeated implementation: a practical characterization ⋮ Nash implementation without no-veto power ⋮ Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective ⋮ Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ Rationalizable implementation ⋮ A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Time and Nash implementation
Cites Work
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Exact implementation
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Bayesian Implementation
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Voluntary implementation
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