Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.002zbMath1153.91691OpenAlexW2145015113MaRDI QIDQ864893

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn

Publication date: 13 February 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2004/60404.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingcouplesresponsivenessrandom paths

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (31)

Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories ⋮ Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries ⋮ Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks ⋮ Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance ⋮ Analysis of stochastic matching markets ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games ⋮ Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples ⋮ Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ School choice with neighbors ⋮ Stochastic stability in assignment problems ⋮ Stability and convergence in matching processes for shared mobility systems ⋮ Paths to stability in the assignment problem ⋮ Fair and efficient student placement with couples ⋮ Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty ⋮ Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching ⋮ Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration ⋮ Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem ⋮ Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples ⋮ Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games ⋮ Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods ⋮ Fair cake-cutting among families ⋮ On the accessibility of core-extensions ⋮ Paths to stable allocations ⋮ Matching with partners and projects ⋮ MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY

Cites Work

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• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• On randomized matching mechanisms
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• NP-complete stable matching problems
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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