Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90012-7zbMath0432.90007OpenAlexW2046680136MaRDI QIDQ1138980

Robert A. Pollak, Douglas H. Blair

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90012-7

zbMATH Keywords

social choicegeneralizationdictatorshipArrow's impossibility theoremcollective rationalityrelaxation of conditions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (24)

Arrovian social choice with psychological thresholds ⋮ Oligarchies in spatial environments ⋮ Incomplete decision-making and Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ Weak independence and the Pareto principle ⋮ Arrow's decisive coalitions ⋮ Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity ⋮ Intransitive social strict preference and the Arrow theorem ⋮ Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence ⋮ The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory ⋮ Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains ⋮ Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions. ⋮ Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis ⋮ Acyclic and positive responsive social choice with infinite individuals. An alternative `invisible dictator' theorem ⋮ Towards an axiomatization of orderings ⋮ Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations ⋮ Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions ⋮ Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness ⋮ Some algebraic characterizations of preference structures ⋮ Rights Revisited, and Limited ⋮ Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems ⋮ Semiorders and collective choice ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem ⋮ New problems in the general choice theory

Cites Work

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• Semiorders and collective choice
• On the theory of aggregation
• Choice functions, rationality conditions, and variations on the weak axiom of revealed preference
• Impossibility theorems without collective rationality
• Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• Semiorders and the Theory of Choice
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions

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