Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90036-HzbMath0758.90092OpenAlexW2080158665MaRDI QIDQ1201137

George J. Mailath

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90036-h

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)

Related Items (13)

Search, evolution, and money ⋮ Evolution in mechanisms for public projects ⋮ Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs ⋮ Intervening duality and bargaining with a farmer-landowner example. ⋮ Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination ⋮ Purposive contradiction, intervening duality and the nature of probability ⋮ On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games ⋮ Learning to cooperate with Pavlov and adaptive strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma with noise ⋮ Genetic algorithm learning and evolutionary games ⋮ The evolution of money as a medium of exchange ⋮ Forecasting errors and bounded rationality: An example

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