Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.013zbMath1398.91367OpenAlexW2766421488MaRDI QIDQ1691346

Xiang Han

Publication date: 16 January 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.013

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitypriorityhouse allocationhousing marketgroup strategy-proofnessindivisible object

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

A market design approach to job rotation ⋮ Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems ⋮ On two mechanisms in job rotation problems ⋮ Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities ⋮ Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities ⋮ Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
• Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
• Constrained school choice
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• House allocation with existing tenants
• On cores and indivisibility
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Making just school assignments
• Robust stability in matching markets
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities