Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.05.010zbMath1425.91347OpenAlexW2950872437WikidataQ127641008 ScholiaQ127641008MaRDI QIDQ2273939

Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino

Publication date: 19 September 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessPareto dominanceoutside optionsstudent-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (12)

Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? ⋮ Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation with outside option ⋮ School choice with transferable student characteristics ⋮ Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources ⋮ School choice with costly information acquisition ⋮ Reallocation with priorities ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible ⋮ Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab

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