Incentives in landing slot problems

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.003zbMath1400.91381OpenAlexW2189178511MaRDI QIDQ2359379

James Schummer, Azar Abizada

Publication date: 28 June 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

matchingincentivesmechanism designlanding slots

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (7)

Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem ⋮ Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers ⋮ Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Reordering an existing queue ⋮ Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
• Manipulation via capacities revisited
• An impossibility theorem for matching problems
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Comparative statics in matching markets
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Manipulation through bribes
• House allocation with existing tenants
• On cores and indivisibility
• Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Optimization and mediated bartering models for ground delay programs
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
• MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*
• Matchings in connection with ground delay program planning
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods

This page was built for publication: Incentives in landing slot problems