Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
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Publication:2365328
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0090zbMath0871.90134OpenAlexW1979082611MaRDI QIDQ2365328
Michael Kahneman, Elchanan Ben-Porath
Publication date: 23 February 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0090
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