A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026zbMath1165.91365OpenAlexW2018654346MaRDI QIDQ2389312

Selçuk Özyurt, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 15 July 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessGibbard-Satterthwaite theoremhyperfunctionsmanipulationsocial choice correspondences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Threshold aggregation of the three-graded rankings ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Manipulability of consular election rules ⋮ A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives ⋮ Tops-only domains ⋮ Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes ⋮ Nash implementation via hyperfunctions ⋮ Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity ⋮ On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives ⋮ Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules ⋮ A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Circular domains ⋮ Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets ⋮ Choosers as extension axioms

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