Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0624-4zbMath1287.91056OpenAlexW2057017938MaRDI QIDQ2450079

Bernardo Moreno, Dolors Berga, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 16 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/418_revised.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

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