Learning in games by random sampling

DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2694zbMath0994.91006OpenAlexW2094499789MaRDI QIDQ5938633

James W. Friedman, Claudio Mezzetti

Publication date: 23 July 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/98d50a50ffe4dcb8f7924b0fd3817aff2af7658c

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumbounded rationalityrepeated interactionsstrategic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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