Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
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Publication:485428
DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0813-ZzbMath1307.91135OpenAlexW2052215611MaRDI QIDQ485428
Publication date: 9 January 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0813-z
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