Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence

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Publication:1107402

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90096-8zbMath0652.90013OpenAlexW1983254396MaRDI QIDQ1107402

Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90096-8




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