The central assignment game and the assignment markets
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Publication:1167052
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90038-6zbMath0489.90025OpenAlexW2009911096MaRDI QIDQ1167052
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d05/d0563.pdf
existence of a competitive equilibriumnonemptiness of the coreassignment game without side paymentsmarket model with indivisible goods
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Cites Work
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- Note on transferable utility
- On cores and indivisibility
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Housing markets with indivisibilities
- On the core and competitive equilibria of a market with indivisible goods
- The Core of an N Person Game
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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