Queue allocation of indivisible goods
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Recommendations
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- A cooperative approach to queue allocation of indivisible objects
- Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
Cited in
(45)- Random assignment under weak preferences
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
- A complete characterization of hierarchy
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- A note on the assignment problem with uniform preferences
- Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
- Strategy-proof popular mechanisms
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
- Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences: uncertainty models, algorithms, and complexity
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Overlapping multiple object assignments
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
- A cooperative approach to queue allocation of indivisible objects
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- Transparent matching mechanisms
- Ordinal simplicity in discrete mechanism design
- Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules
- Counting houses of Pareto optimal matchings in the house allocation problem
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
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