Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
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Publication:465694
DOI10.1016/j.cosrev.2012.03.001zbMath1298.68101arXiv1108.4439MaRDI QIDQ465694
Publication date: 24 October 2014
Published in: Computer Science Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4439
91B12: Voting theory
68-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to computer science
68Q17: Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)
91B14: Social choice
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