A Bayesian model of voting in juries

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0843zbMath1006.91028OpenAlexW2039063610MaRDI QIDQ700076

César Martinelli, John Duggan

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/1038

zbMATH Keywords

voting rulesCondorce jury theoremresponsive cutoff equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (33)

First and second best voting rules in committees ⋮ Picking the winners ⋮ The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition ⋮ Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition ⋮ Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury ⋮ Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives ⋮ Voting in small committees ⋮ Information aggregation with a continuum of types ⋮ Evaluation and strategic manipulation ⋮ Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections ⋮ Consistent representative democracy ⋮ Conservativeness in jury decision-making ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ Judgment aggregation in search for the truth ⋮ Voting with public information ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ Unanimous rules in the laboratory ⋮ Convergence results for unanimous voting ⋮ The scholarship assignment problem ⋮ Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting ⋮ Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments ⋮ Jury theorems with multiple alternatives ⋮ A theory of hung juries and informative voting ⋮ Would rational voters acquire costly information? ⋮ Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition ⋮ The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences ⋮ Full information equivalence in large elections ⋮ Voting to persuade ⋮ Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low? ⋮ Subgroup deliberation and voting ⋮ Optimal delay in committees ⋮ Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors ⋮ Voting on tricky questions

Cites Work

• Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

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