Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.005zbMath1236.91106MaRDI QIDQ719868

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Elena Molis

Publication date: 12 October 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2454/18593

zbMATH Keywords

absorbing sets; housing market; indifferences; top trading cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B60: Trade models

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

91B68: Matching models

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